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Abstract 
The paper studies the evolution and determinants of banking integration across European 
countries, including New Member States, with attention to the impact that the Euro might 
have on that process. It is the first time that banking integration is being studied using the 
data on international consolidated banking assets provided by the BIS. The paper also 
presents empirical evidence on the determinants of the flow of foreign banking assets across 
countries of the EU and the Euro area. Banking integration in Europe is still low but it 
progresses over time. The empirical evidence also shows that integration is affected by both, 
competitive and institutional conditions so it can not be viewed as a uniform and balanced 
process across all countries. Finally, evidence is provided indicating that the introduction of 
the Euro has changed the pace and trend of European banking integration. 
JEL: F36, G18, G21 
Key words: banking integration, internationalisation, openness, Euro 
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1 Introduction 
The creation of the Euro is an important step forward towards economic integration and the 
formation of a single market in Europe. A common currency is expected to have a special 
impact in the economic integration of European financial markets since it means a common 
monetary policy and a unique basic interest rate for the whole Euro zone. Instead of a dozen 
of fragmented national financial markets each with its own currency, the Monetary Union 
eliminates the national currencies, one of the main sources of fragmentation, and sets up 
conditions to create a unified financial services market for 12 of the 15 country members, 
now 25 since last May 10 Central and Eastern European countries were accepted as new 
members. 
But as it is the case with non financial products and services, to remove technical 
and economic barriers to trade and flows of goods and services across European Union (EU) 
members does not mean necessarily that trade and cross country flows will actually take 
place. The creation of a single currency is made precisely with the purpose of increasing 
the economic benefits of larger markets, in terms of more opportunities for specialization and 
gains from trade. Several studies present evidence of potential gains of the economic 
integration, in terms of economic growth for equity and bonds markets, European 
Commission (2002), and for all financial markets, Guiso et al (2004).1 Since these gains are 
substantial it is of interest to know if financial market integration is actually taking place, both 
for the whole financial markets and for individual segments, such as the banking sector. 
This paper presents empirical evidence of cross country flows of banking assets in 
the Euro zone in the period 1999-2003, that is, the period when countries have lived with the 
single currency. The interest of the research is to evaluate the trend in integration of banking 
activity that can be inferred from the cross country flows and also investigate up to what 
extent the enlargement of the European Union with New Member States (NMS) can stimulate 
or slow down the process. Second, the paper responds to the question of whether a single 
currency has in fact fostered such integration, and, finally, it explores the institutional and 
economic forces that may enhance or limit cross countries flows of banking assets. 
Our research uses data on cross country flows of banking assets published by 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) consolidated international banking statistics 
which, even though it is the most reliable public data on international banking assets, 
to our knowledge it has not yet been used for this purpose.2 The measures of integration 
documented in the paper are country openness, which we define as the flow of assets from 
outside that enter into a national market, and internationalization of national banking systems, 
which we define as the flow of assets from banks of a given country to the rest of countries. 
Each of them is aggregated into European measures of openness and internationalization. 
Finally, distinct features of the paper are that it explains receiving and sending flows as a 
function of an array of institutional and economic country variables and those trends in asset 
                                                                          
1. This paper was first published as European Commission Economic Paper, Gianetti et al. (2002). 
2. Papaioannou (2005) studies the determinants of international bank flows using BIS locational international 
banking statistics. Locational data refers to international financial claims and liabilities of banks resident in a given 
country, while consolidated data uses as creditor reporting basis the nationality (home country) of the lender on a 
worldwide consolidated basis, net of inter-office accounts (i.e. net of internal transactions between subsidiaries and the 
parent bank). We believe that consolidated data has several advantages to study banking integration, compared with 
locational data, since it provides a measure of the risk exposure of lenders’ national banking systems and avoids double 
counting. One limitation of the consolidated data is that, to our purposes, it is only available since 1999. 
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flows among EMU and non-EMU countries are evaluated controlling for world wide trends in 
internationalization. 
Research on European banking integration has been taken place for several years, 
some times sponsored by the European Central Bank (ECB) itself, as ECB (2003a) and 
Trichet (2003). Dermine (2002), Cabral, Dierick and Vesala (2002) provide a comprehensive 
empirical overview of cross border banking activity using data on prices and quantities and 
looking at wholesale as well as retail banking services. More recently, Baele et al (2004) 
present an overview of the state of financial integration in the Euro area, including, money, 
government bond, loan and deposit and equity markets, and the European Commission has 
established a regular monitoring of financial integration, European Commission (2004). Quiros 
and Mendizabal (2001), Danthine et all (2000) and Fernández de Guevara et al (2003) view 
banking integration mainly from the law of one price and convergence in interest rates and 
margins. On the other hand, Manna (2004) studies banking integration using cross border 
quantity flows for several banking assets using non consolidated bank level data, and 
calculating several measures of integration.3 The dominant conclusion in these studies is that 
financial integration in general, and banking integration in particular, is evolving at a different 
pace across financial instruments and services. Integration appears higher in money markets 
and interbank markets and lower in retail banking. 
Our paper uses flows of cross border activity with banking assets, but differs from 
previous research in European banking integration in that it uses BIS data on international 
assets. The data refer to flows from consolidated banks, a clear advantage to avoid double 
counting compared to using unconsolidated balance sheet data (see footnote 2). Second, 
the paper measures the effect of the Euro in the integration process controlling for the 
general trend in international flows of banking assets inside and outside the Euro and 
the European Union. Third, preliminary evidence is provided on institutional and economic 
forces behind integration, both for countries inflows and for countries outflows of 
banking assets. Four, in order to gain some insights in future developments after enlargement 
of the EU, the paper measures integration with and without New Member States. The analysis 
has the limitation that only data on aggregate flows is available and therefore the analysis at 
the level of several products as in Manna (2004), it is not possible. 
We find evidence that cross country flows of banking assets in the Euro zone is 
progressing at a faster pace than the general trend in financial services integration world 
wide, an indication that the single currency is in fact stimulating the process. This is true for 
assets received from other Euro area countries. Second, the Euro alone is by itself an 
institutional factor that enhances integration after controlling for factors that tend to explain 
why outflows and inflows are more important in some countries than in others.4 Third, 
banking services of NMS are already well integrated into the European Union and at this point 
in time the measures of integration give similar values when applied to these countries 
alone as when they are applied to the enlarged area. The main reason for this is that 
significant parts of the banking system of most of the NMS are already under the control of 
banks from EU-15 countries.5 
                                                                          
3. A more complete list of references to papers on European financial integration that goes further back in time can be 
found in Manna (2004). Rajan and Zingales (2003) view integration of financial markets within the context of banking 
versus non intermediated financial markets and convergence in models of corporate governance and control. 
4. In the spirit of La Porta et al (1998), Beck et al (2001), Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Caprio et al (2003). 
5. However, this may create new supervisory challenges. See Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2004) and Quinn (2004), for 
supervisory challenges, and see Claessens et al. (2000) and Crystal et al. (2001) for a review of the benefits of foreign 
ownership of the banking system from the point of view of regulation and prudential supervision. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion about 
the meaning and evaluation of banking integration. Section 3 describes the indicators used in 
this paper, and analyze their evolution over time in the period of study. Section 4 reviews 
some of the economic and institutional factors behind banking integration, and presents 
evidence about the explanatory power of these factors to account for differences in openness 
and internationalization of European countries. Section 5 draws some policy implications of 
the findings for banking supervisors. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2 Meaning and evaluation of banking integration 
The introduction of the Euro is one of the many, although especially important, steps towards 
what has been called the Single European Market. Broadly, a “single market” means that all 
buyers and sellers within the boundaries of the Union have ex ante equal opportunities to 
trade among themselves, independently of the country in which buying and selling takes 
place. A single currency contributes to the creation of a single market if it increases the 
number of buyers and sellers that can potentially enter into profitable transactions and/or it 
evens the opportunities to transact towards the more favorable ones in terms of welfare 
creation. The Euro is expected to make this kind of contribution as long as it eliminates 
the exchange rate risk; increases price transparency and, overall lower transaction costs.6  
Financial markets and banking markets, in particular, share the common potential 
benefits of a single currency and have other especially relevant ones. The introduction of the 
Euro goes together with the creation of a European Central Bank in charge of the monetary 
policy decisions for the whole Euro-countries. This means the same basic interest rate for all 
country members and, if there is one price, there must also be one market (single interbank 
market). Second, the reduction of transaction costs will stimulate trade more intensively in 
those goods and services that have lower transportation or other costs originated from the 
physical movement of goods and services. Financial transactions are, in many cases, virtual 
transactions as they imply book keeping notations but no physical movements of goods and 
services at all, so lower transaction related costs (contractual costs) should have a positive 
effect in stimulating trade of financial services. Not all, of course, since for many customers 
there are high perceived benefits from physical proximity and face to face transactions for 
example in retail banking activities and relationship lending between banks and firms. 
According to Guiso et al (2004) European financial integration will accelerate the development 
of the most backward financial markets and this development can produce a sustained 
additional growth of GDP in the EU countries of 0.2% yearly. 
European financial and banking integration can then be viewed as a process 
converging into a single market for financial/banking products and services, where all buyers 
and sellers within the Union have opportunities to transact in the most favorable terms. The 
Euro and the removal of regulatory and institutional barriers to trade and to cross-country 
investments can stimulate banking integration, but there is also interest in knowing if 
expectations are actually fulfilled. In this respect, studies on banking integration have focused 
on ex post evaluation of the actual progresses being made towards the single market, looking 
at price convergence and at the actual flows of goods and services. 
A single market must be matched by only one price for the product that defines the 
market. The so-called law of one price is the benchmark for studies on banking integration 
that focus on interest rate convergence after the Euro; Quiros and Mendizabal (2001), 
Fernández de Guevara et al. (2003), Baele et al. (2004). Less interest rate dispersion among 
countries together with convergence towards the lowest prevailing interest rate in loans and 
the highest in deposits will confirm that the Euro stimulates banking integration and increases 
social welfare. 
                                                                          
6. Baele et al. (2004) define an integrated financial market as a market where all potential participants with the same 
characteristics, i) face a single set of rules when dealing with financial instruments or services; ii) have equal access to 
the services and iii) receive an equal treatment. They propose a number of measures to evaluate the state of the 
evolution of financial integration in money, corporate bond, government bond, credit and equity markets, that 
are partially inspired in those proposed by  Adam et al. (2002) on their report for the European Commission. 
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Tests of the law of one price require a proper definition of the relevant market. 
Consumers’ transportation costs and potential gains of relational banking create conditions 
for geographic market segmentation so that in the case of retail banking the relevant market 
can be a local area grouping several bank branches. Second, product differentiation efforts 
and investment in borrowers’ and depositors’ specific information by banks, in response to 
the increase in competition, can “customize” the banking relationship and increase interest 
rate differences among banks, Boot and Thakor (2000). Finally, interest rate dispersion 
among EU countries will be sensitive to the evolution of the monetary conditions and, in 
particular, to the evolution of the interbank interest rate. The latter can distort the conclusions 
of interest rate converge due to the single currency effect. To see this, notice that the 
equilibrium profit maximizing interest rate of deposits in market i, assuming Cournot type 
competition, will equal to, 
1+= dii
dii
di n
n
RR ε
ε
 
where Rdi is the equilibrium interest rate in deposits in country i, ni is the number of banks in 
the market, εdi is the supply elasticity of deposits and R is the interbank interest rate, the same 
in all Euro countries after the introduction of the single currency (we assume zero marginal 
operating costs). The standard deviation of Rdi can be used as a measure of interest rates 
dispersion. 
Once the interbank interest rate R is the same in all countries dispersion of interest 
rates is explained in terms of differences in structural conditions, number of banks, elasticity 
of deposits’ supply, across markets. If R remains stable over time and the Euro creates 
positive conditions for convergence in structural conditions across markets, then the 
introduction of the Euro will coincide with the start of a process of convergence in interest 
rates. But notice that for given structural conditions dispersion of interest rates across 
countries varies over time with changes in the interbank interest rate R. Before the Euro, 
dispersion in interest rates across EU countries reflected both, differences in structural 
conditions and differences in interbank interest rates. After the Euro interbank interest rate 
differences disappear and for this reason some convergence in interest rates can be 
expected even if the structural conditions in each country remain unchanged. The observed 
decreasing trend in the interbank interest rate set by the ECB in recent years also has to be 
accounted for to explain convergence in interest rates across countries beyond potential 
changes in structural conditions. 
Studies of banking integration focusing on quantities instead of prices base their 
conclusions on the expected changes in equilibrium market shares when the enlargement of 
a market coincides with a change in the comparative relative competitive advantages of 
the firms in old markets, Manna (2004). Under the same Cournot competition conditions 
assumed above, equilibrium market shares of deposits of banks in a market will be inversely 
related to marginal operating costs, i.e. more efficient banks will have larger equilibrium 
market share. If initially segregated national banking markets evolve into a single market, 
national banks will start to compete and those more efficient will gain share at the expense of 
the less efficient ones. Cross border flows of deposits may be observed in response to the 
new competitive conditions, which just reflect the transition from the old to the new 
equilibrium. To make effective the potential gains in share, more efficient banks may have to 
undertake direct foreign investment, for example open branches or to purchase existing 
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branch networks in the country they are entering, that will also be part of the cross countries 
flows of banking assets.  
From this perspective, and assuming that before the Euro and before the true 
economic conditions for a single market the differences in efficiency among banks of different 
countries were important, banking integration will be far away from symmetric flows of 
banking assets across countries. Rather, flows towards countries that have more efficient 
banks should increase at the expense of those with more inefficient ones. The new structure 
of banking markets in the enlarged European market can differ from the old in many ways, 
including number of surviving banks and their respective specialization in segments of 
banking products as a function of their comparative competitive advantage in each of the 
segments. Universal banks may divest some activities in which they are not competitive and 
concentrate all the efforts in a core of services in which they are particularly efficient, to the 
point of becoming more specialized in products but more diversified in geographic markets. 
In this scenario, equilibrium interest rates of homogeneous products will be the same 
in all banks, although each of them can have different market shares and profits. If economic 
markets extend beyond country borders then convergence in interest rates among countries 
will just reflect the characteristics of the market. But if banks differentiate products and cost is 
no longer the only source of competitive advantage then market boundaries are difficult to 
identify and the interest rate differences among banks and countries may persist even if there 
are cross-country flows of banking assets. Finally, high differences in efficiency among banks 
may incentive spur mergers and acquisitions and increase concentration in certain product 
and geographic markets even if the total market has enlarged. The efficiency effect behind 
market concentration will also push towards more favorable interest rates from a welfare point 
of view, but collusion practices can be easy to implement in markets with less number of 
competitors. Thus, the net effect of banking integration from the perspective of the 
cross-country flows of banking assets is an open question. 
As indicated in the introduction, this paper focuses on flows of banking assets 
across EU countries to calibrate banking integration in the Euro era. The main purpose 
of the exercise is to provide evidence of the amount of these flows without making any 
welfare inference of this evidence. The underlying assumption is that the Euro creates 
conditions where more efficient banks can gain market share over less efficient ones and, as 
a result, there will be an increasing trend in cross country flows of banking assets in the Euro 
area in the process towards the new equilibrium. More flows will be interpreted as an 
indication of higher integration, assuming that the opportunities for reallocation of assets are 
high because the initial differences in efficiency are also high. 
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3 Some quantity indicators of European banking integration 
So far, flows of banks’ assets across European countries have been approximated in different 
ways, for example interbank exposures, deposits, loans, shares and securities holdings, 
branches, mergers and acquisitions.7 However, there is another piece of information that 
potentially might be useful for this purpose but has been ignored so far. That information 
comes from BIS reporting on foreign assets by banking systems of developed countries. 
Those assets are broken down by country of destination (i.e. not only contains information 
across developed countries but also of banking assets held in emerging markets by, mainly, 
banks of developed countries). In this section, some indicators of international activity at the 
country level and for the Euro area and the European Union as a whole are presented, 
together with measures of them for the years 1999 to 2003. 
The assets reported by banks to BIS are financial assets. Thus, they include 
government debt held by banks as well as interbank exposures and loans to the private 
sector plus equity of financial and non-financial firms. The data is reported at a consolidated 
level. Therefore, cross operations between the parent bank and its subsidiaries abroad have 
been properly eliminated. That is very important in order to avoid double counting of foreign 
assets. An individual or solo bank approach might bias the amount of foreign assets abroad. 
For instance, if a parent bank lends funds to a subsidiary or a branch in a foreign country and 
that subsidiary or branch uses the funds to make loans in that country, individual reporting 
might add up both the assets of the subsidiary or the branch and the loan from the parent to 
fund the assets being hold in that country. On the contrary, a consolidated approach will net 
out the flow between the parent and the subsidiary and avoid double counting of foreign 
assets; which is an important advantage of consolidated statistics versus locational statistics. 
Moreover, BIS data is reported by banks and does not include, for instance, assets of money 
market mutual funds. 
Country breakdown of foreign assets, both at the level of reporting and non-reporting 
countries, is only available since 1999. Thus, it is not possible to determine a direct impact of 
Euro on banking integration from this data. However, we are more interested in medium term 
trends since the impact must be not of an impulse-type but, rather, more progressive through 
time.8 
The introduction of the Euro is likely to modify the amount of foreign bank assets 
held in other Euro zone countries. Since January 1999 exchange rate risk disappeared, so 
banks might be keener to hold debt or equity issued in other Euro countries. Moreover, they 
might be less reluctant, for the same reason, to lend to foreign banks operating in the area. 
For the same token, and since integration is a two way process, countries will receive more 
banking assets from abroad than when each country had its own currency. Absolute 
indicators might be influenced by the general trend in bank assets, both domestic and 
foreign. Therefore, we should focus on relative magnitudes (i.e. percentage of foreign assets 
over total banking assets or GDP). 
                                                                          
7. See, in particular, Cabral et al. (2002), Baele et al. (2004), Manna (2004) and European Commission (2004). 
8. Rajan and Zingales (2003) test quite crudely the impact of euro using a dummy variable that takes de value of 1 
from 1999 onwards and 0 otherwise. Thus, their hypothesis is that the euro has a sudden and permanent change. 
However, it seems more reasonable to expect that the institutional framework changes only slowly to the appearance of 
the Euro, in particular in banking markets (out of interbank and, to a lesser extend, wholesale markets). 
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Some indicators of European banking integration: outflows and inflows of banking assets 
relative to total banking assets and GDP 
The first indicator of cross border activity, I1, is the amount of bank assets of a given 
country that are owned by foreign banks, over total banking assets of the receiving country. 
The second indicator of cross border activity, I2, measures the assets held abroad by banks 
of a given country, relative to the total banking assets of the sending country. The indicator I1 
gives an indication of the degree of openness to foreign banking activity of a particular 
country, while I2 indicates the internationalization of the banks of a given country. 
Total assets of each national banking system are only available, in a homogeneous 
way, for EU countries and only up to 2002.9 In order to expand our field of comparison 
and see if developments are different among Euro zone and/or EU countries and the other 
developed countries that report information to BIS on foreign assets, we modify the 
indicators I1 and I2 to normalize the absolute flows in terms of GDP instead of total assets, 
since data on GDP is available for all countries. When necessary, the indicators normalized by 
the GDP of the country will be identified as I21 and I22, respectively. 
From Table 1, Panel A, column Received, we see that the amount of “openness” of 
national banking systems to foreign bank assets from other euro area or EU-15 countries (I1) 
is relatively low. The weighted average of national figures, which can be considered a 
measure of European integration that takes into account the size of the receiving country, is 
around 10% during the period under study. However, the simple average is around 15% 
indicating that smaller countries are more open than larger ones, as one could expect. In 
particular, France and Germany appear as countries quite closed to the presence of foreign 
banks, since their figures of openness are quite below the average. Nevertheless, in weighted 
(simple) averages there is a tentative trend towards more open banking systems in the Euro 
area starting from 1999, since assets received from foreign banks of other Euro area 
countries were 8.6% (13%) of the total banking assets of the country in 1999, and go up 
to 11.1% (17%) in 2002. 
Regarding the foreign assets that banks from a country hold in the other Euro area 
countries, (I2), from Table 1, Panel A, column Sent, again the average level is low and 
there are less differences across countries according to their size (simple and weighted 
averages are quite similar). Belgium and Netherlands, two small countries with some large 
bancassurance groups operating in both countries, are the two countries clearly with more 
internationally active banks in the Euro zone. Again, a tentative increasing trend towards 
internationalization can be perceived, from 8.6% in 1999 to 12.1% in 2002. 
If the whole European Union is considered, bottom of Table 1, Panel B, integration 
measures increase in value around 2 percentage points (pp) and also show an increase along 
time. In particular, UK, one of the major world financial centers, appears as  integrated as the 
rest of the EU countries, specially in terms of bank assets received, I1, but much less in terms 
of banking activity abroad, I2. Moreover, Sweden and UK show no trend in the measures of 
integration over time. 
Data in Table 1 is summarized in Chart 1, which also includes the average aggregate 
measure of integration computed with GDP as normalization factor in order to provide 
preliminary information about the integration trend in year 2003. The observation of the chart, 
                                                                          
9. See ECB (2003b). 
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as well as the country level data not reported to save space, confirms that in year 2003, the 
trend of banking integration continues at the pace initiated years before. 
Table 2, constructed in a similar way as Table 1 with GDP as a normalisation factor, 
allows us to compare observed trends in internationalization within the European Union with 
trends in all developed countries. Large developed countries as Japan and USA are relatively 
closed countries as they hold abroad, among developed countries, fewer assets than large 
European countries. Japan appears more active sending assets abroad than receiving them, 
while for the USA the reverse is true. In this larger sample of countries UK shows a similar 
proportion of banking assets sent and received. In any case, Table 2 confirms that the trend 
towards more banking integration is common among developed countries, evidence that 
should be taken into account when evaluating the effect of Euro in such integration. 
Overall, Tables1 and 2, as well as Chart 1, show a low, in particular for large 
countries, although increasing trend towards banking systems integration. That effect is quite 
clear among European Union countries and Euro area countries as well.10 
New Member States 
Regarding New Member States, we only have information of the flows received from 
developed countries and not from the flows they send abroad. Nevertheless, the latter are 
probably much less important in quantitative terms since banks from those countries 
are mainly local and, more importantly, the foreign ownership of those banks is quite high. 
In four of the countries the market share of banks owned by foreigners is above 85%, 
while in 3 countries is around two thirds. Only the banks in the smallest countries, especially 
Malta and Cyprus, seem to have maintained their independence.11 Again, we only have data 
from 1999 onwards and we can only compute the indicators based on GDP measures since 
we do not have total banking assets of the countries along time. 
Table 3, Panel A, shows that New Member States, in simple average terms, tend to 
receive a similar percentage of foreign assets as Euro zone countries. However, in terms of 
weighted averages, the importance of the flows received is higher (around 10 pp the last 
three years). If we take into account that the relative weight of total banking assets in terms 
of GDP is much higher in the Euro zone countries [Caviglia et al. (2002)], this is an additional 
indication of the importance of foreign assets in the NMS banking systems. 
Table 3 also shows that there is a clear trend towards an increase in the openness of 
these countries that might reflect the growing interest of Euro zone banks in those emerging 
countries that, finally, joined the EU in May 2004. In this sense, it is interesting that in 1999 
and 2000 simple average is higher than weighted average, an indication that small countries 
were receiving more banking assets. Nevertheless, differences between simple and weighted 
average have vanished over time, an indication that bigger countries have become also an 
attractive destinations of funds for Euro zone banks. 
Table 3, Panel B, shows even higher degrees of openness when we take into 
account those countries members of the EU-15 that are not in the Euro zone. In particular, 
the increase is more significant in the Baltic Republics (as a result of the flows coming 
from Sweden) and Malta (from UK) for geographical and historical reasons. Finally, openness 
                                                                          
10. Papaiaoannou (2005), with BIS locational statistics, also finds evidence of increasing banking integration in Euro 
countries after the introduction of the single currency. 
11. See, Caviglia et al. (2002). 
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increases a few percentage points when we add the flow of funds received from all developed 
countries as shown in Table 3, Panel C. 
Chart 2 shows that among developed countries, those from the Euro zone are the 
ones that have more foreign assets in NMS. The historical relationships between those 
groups of countries coupled with proximity, which helps to explain higher flows of economic 
transactions, might be the explanatory factors. However, some banks from countries with 
less historical relationships are also present in New Member States while other internationally 
active banks from large countries have not shown much interest until now. Belgian and 
Austrian banks have been very active in relative terms (Table 4) while German, Dutch, Italian 
and French banks have a lower penetration, in terms of their GDP. Spanish banks have 
played a marginal role. 
The former result is, partially, the result of the different strategies of 
internationalization carried out by banks. Austrian, Belgian, and Finish banks concentrate 
in NMS more than half of their foreign assets in emerging markets (Table 5). Moreover, that 
percentage has increased systematically and significantly since 1999. On the other hand, 
Dutch, French and German banks concentrate in Eastern Europe less than one third of the 
foreign assets in emerging markets. It seems that, banks from smaller countries, which may 
appear initially as less internationally active banks, are trying to exploit competitive advantages 
focusing increasingly in New Member States while larger banks from larger countries follow a 
more diversified strategy with a significant presence in all the markets. 
NMS in the portfolio of foreign banking assets of banks world wide 
The internationalization strategy of banks can separate foreign investment decisions that 
involve developed countries and decisions involving emerging ones. In order to provide 
additional evidence on how the enlargement of the European Union can affect banking 
integration it may be of interest to evaluate the flow of banking assets to NMS in the context 
of investment strategies towards emerging countries. The study of global portfolios of foreign 
banking assets of the countries we follow in this study may provide some valuable information 
in this respect. 
Table 6, Panel A, shows that since 2000, one year after the introduction of the Euro, 
Euro zone countries are concentrating the flows of funds sent abroad in other Euro zone 
countries (from 30.8% in 2000 to 35.3% in 2003, simple average) while almost maintaining 
them in the rest of EU-15 countries (at least, in weighted averages), or even decreasing in 
other developed countries and in emerging countries. However, regarding the group of 
emerging countries, only the relative weight of funds sent to emerging countries in Europe 
and, in particular, to New Member States, has increased. 
When we consider the foreign assets sent abroad by EU banks, some of the former 
developments are less clear cut. In general, the increasing importance of foreign assets in 
New Member States banking systems declines since other emerging markets seem to 
be attracting funds from European banks (Table 6, Panel B). Finally, when we add all the 
developed countries, the weight of total foreign assets in New Member States is much lower 
although it still shows an increasing trend (Table 6, Panel C). 
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The tentative conclusion has to be that NMS become relative more attractive to 
foreign banks within the group of emerging countries as the expectations that they will join the 
European Union consolidate over time and they are finally fulfilled. 
Statistical significance of the observed trends towards an increase in internationalization and 
openness 
The last step in this examination of the trends in inflows and outflows of banking assets is to 
test for the statistically significance of the observed trends over time. Since internationalization 
of banking activity can be a global phenomena the trends in the flows among Euro zone 
countries can just be part of a general trend in internationalization. The methodology used to 
isolate the Euro effect is a simple linear regression where the dependent variable is the 
outflow (inflow) of bank assets divided by the country GDP of the country every year 
from 1999 to 2003, and the explanatory variables are time and country dummies, 
together with a cross effect that allows for differences in the coefficients of the time dummies 
of the Euro countries over time. The analysis will account too for possible differences 
with NMS. In particular, we define a Euro dummy variable (i.e. 1 if the country is member of 
the European Monetary Union, 0 otherwise), and a MNS dummy variable (i.e. 1 if the country 
is a NMS, 0 otherwise) that multiply the time dummies so their respective estimated 
coefficients will determine differences of Euro (NMS) relative to the rest of the world. The 
results of the regression estimation are presented in Table 7. 
The analysis shows that the Euro Area attracts banking assets at a higher increasing 
rate than the rate of other developed countries (column 1). The inclusion of New Member 
States does not change the former conclusion regarding received foreign claims (column 2). 
However, column 3 shows that there is not a statistically significant effect for NMS and the 
increasing trend observed in the flows they received must be considered in the context of a 
global trend of openness among the countries considered. 
When explaining the banking assets sent abroad by the banks in a country the 
effect is not statistically significant. As it will be confirmed later on, this is evidence of some 
asymmetries in the flows received and sent across countries.12  
                                                                          
12. Using disaggregated Spanish data we have investigated to what extend the trends in banking integration 
concentrate in interbank money market flows. Although the interbank market is the most integrated, the 
general conclusion about a steady trend in integration for the rest of the products remains unchanged. 
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4 Determinants of banking integration 
4.1 Some tentative hypothesis about determinants of banking integration 
Even if trade and monetary barriers are levied, economic integration may not be a natural 
phenomena as account has to be taken of the incentives of the economic agents to go 
abroad, of the institutional conditions of the countries of origin and reception in terms for 
example of property rights protection and, specially in the case of banking markets, 
the influence of regulation. Moreover, these factors may play a different role to explain 
integration in terms of assets sent abroad than in terms of assets received. This section 
presents some tentative hypothesis on factors that can explain the differences observed in 
the inflows and outflows of banking assets in the process of internationalization.13 Next we will 
provide some evidence on how such hypotheses are consistent or not with the empirical 
data. 
Efficiency and competition considerations 
The size of the country explains differences in the level of trade. Large domestic markets allow 
domestic firms to grow within the country boundaries even in sectors where scale economies 
are important. Domestic firms in small countries, on the other hand, will have to go abroad to 
gain scale and lower costs producing higher level of output. In general, trade, imports and 
exports, represents a larger share of the GDP in small countries than in large countries. In the 
present context of banking integration a reasonable assumption is that large countries will 
also have relatively larger domestic banking markets and therefore the proportion of foreign 
banking assets in the country will be lower than in small ones. On the other hand, all the rest 
equal it could be expected that small countries will send relatively more banking assets 
abroad than large ones. 
In a competitive market, the market share of the firms is determined by their 
respective level of competitiveness. Within Europe, some countries have more bank oriented 
financial systems while other countries have more capital markets oriented ones. Presumably 
more “bancarised” countries will have a comparative advantage to send banking assets 
abroad, while it will be more difficult to countries with less expertise in banking to gain market 
share in the countries with highly efficient banking systems. Under these assumptions it is 
expected that the share of foreign banking assets will be lower in countries with higher 
“bancarisation”, while this variable will be positively associated with the proportion of banking 
assets sent abroad. 
Another important premise of the theory of competition is that markets where 
incumbent firms earn extraordinary profits attract new entrants, while exit of competitors is 
more likely in more competitive markets than in less competitive ones.14 Moreover, a very 
competitive national banking system might act as a barrier to entry of foreign competitors. 
If the banking system witnesses strong competition among national incumbents, the 
prospects for foreign new entrants are bleak. However, on the other hand, extraordinary 
profits can last longer if the incumbents build effective barriers to entry (i.e. a dense network 
                                                                          
13. For a more general approach to the determinants of international bank flows, within the conceptual framework of 
trade gravity models see Papaioannou (2005). 
14.  See Tirole (1988) and Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a detailed discussion of this issue and for further references. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0519 
of branches, close bank-customer relationships, and high switching costs as a result of 
convenience and proximity, and so on). 
Banks in more competitive domestic markets might seek international expansion in 
order to increase efficiency (more assets with similar costs as in cross border lending) or to 
diversify their loan portfolio in order to gain room for more risk taking and, thus, increase 
profitability,15 which is more in line with local activities carried out through subsidiaries. On the 
other hand, to expand abroad might be highly demanding in terms of funds needed to enter 
into the foreign market (i.e. before the bank acquires a critical mass it must be prepared to 
sustain losses or, if it buys a foreign bank in difficulties it will be necessary to invest significant 
amounts of money). Thus, it might be that less competition at home helps international 
expansion. 
So, the impact of competition (or lack of it) in banking integration might be the 
opposite depending at which side of the coin we are looking at although the final impact is, in 
both cases, an open question that should be tested empirically. In this paper the structure of 
the national banking market will be approximated by the Herfindahl index of concentration. 
For a given number of firms, a higher value of the index implies more opportunities for 
collusion among incumbent firms and, thus, less competition. But very often concentration is 
endogenous and in markets with sunk costs higher competition derives into more 
concentration, Sutton (1991). The interpretation of the empirical results will have to account 
for these alternative meanings of the concentration variable. 
Preferences, regulations and rule of law16 
Ownership structure of banks might have also an impact on the incentives and capabilities of 
local banks to expand abroad or in terms of attraction to foreign banks. State owned banks 
might have more difficulties in being accepted abroad or less incentive to expand. On the 
other hand, since state owned banks have, at most, no competitive advantage regarding 
privately owned banks, foreign banks might see an opportunity to expand their activities. 
Family owned banks might be less interested in foreign expansion since, usually, that would 
mean more demanding capital requirements and, sooner than latter, equity issues that will 
dilute ownership and control of the bank. On the contrary, a widely held bank (i.e. one which 
has no shareholder in the position to control the bank) might have more incentives (including 
expense theory or agency arguments) to expand abroad and more capabilities since they can 
tap equity markets easily (i.e. managers have less binding constraints). On the other hand, a 
banking system were widely held banks are prevalent could be more friendly to foreign banks 
that one where family or state banks dominate the landscape. 
At some point in time banking regulators may be more or less prone to allow their 
national banks to enter other banking markets or, probably more relevant, more or less 
reluctant to allow foreign banks entering the local market. Prudential concerns might be a 
reason to restrict international expansion. Some regulators, those less independent of the 
government, might be interested in protecting national banks from foreign competition, either 
in order to favor the development of “national champions” that can play a leading role in 
                                                                          
15. Hughes et al. (1996) find evidence that more geographically diversified banks do not have lower non-performing 
ratios. Thus, the benefits of geographical diversification are spent away in more risk taking activities (by sector, 
borrowers or whatever) that bring about higher expected profits. 
16. A growing literature emphasizes the relevance of the institutional framework in order to understand 
financial development and, in particular banking sector developments. See, for instance, Barth et al. (2001) and 
La Porta et al. (2002). 
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European markets or to protect vested interest of local banks. The less independent the 
higher the probability of interfering in market forces leading to integration of banking markets. 
The legal system has a well known effect on the development of financial systems 
and economic growth. Papaioannou (2005) provides recent evidence in this topic for 
international bank flows. It might be the case that banking systems pertaining to countries 
with high standards in terms of law enforcement, accounting standards, judiciary efficiency, 
shareholder protection and business ethics attracted more international banks than those in 
the opposite side. 
4.2 Empirical analysis 
The impact, if any, of the former elements is an empirical question that can be tested with the 
available data. The empirical model to be estimated in order to test the theoretical predictions 
outlined above will be formulated as follows: 
ctctccctctctct RULEINDEPWIDEHERFBANCARSIZECiI εαααααα +++++++= 654321)(  
As previously explained, I(1) represents the  total banking inflow of assets received 
by the country over total banking assets of the country banking system, while I(2) is the total 
banking assets sent outside the country, over total banking assets of the country. The actual 
values of these variables are presented in Table 8. 
 The variable SIZE is used to account for the relative size of the country and it is 
measured by the GDP of country c in year t over the sum of all GDP in year t for the countries 
in the sample. The variable BANCAR is equal to the ratio between total banking assets of the 
country c in year t and the country and year GDP; it measures the relative importance of 
banks in the financial system of the country. Variable HERF is the Herfindahl index 
of concentration of the bank assets of country c in period t, calculated from raw data 
published by ECB (2003b). The variable WIDE expresses to what extent the ownership of 
the banks of country c is concentrated or dispersed, where higher values of the variable 
imply higher dispersion of ownership; the actual values of the variable are taken from 
Caprio et al. (2003). INDEP, also from Caprio et al. (2003) is the degree of independence of 
the banking supervisor from the Government. The variable RULE, from La Porta et al. (1998), 
is again a categorical variable that provides an assessment of the law and order tradition in 
the country. 
The empirical model will include time period dummies to evaluate the trend of 
integration within the period under study taking into account the other explanatory variables of 
the model. It can be applied across Euro zone, EU and developed countries. However, since 
there is no easily available information on banking structure variables outside the EU17 and we 
are mainly concerned about integration across European banking markets and the impact of 
Euro, we focus on the two first areas. In particular, expanding the regressions from Euro zone 
countries to EU countries we are able to test if the Euro has had a positive impact on banking 
integration by introducing into the model the variable EURO that takes the value of 1 if the 
                                                                          
17. Moreover, we could also take into account flows towards emerging markets (although there is no data of inflows 
from those countries to developed countries) in general or across several regions (i.e. Central and Eastern European 
Countries or Latin American countries). 
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country belongs to the Euro zone and zero otherwise. If the coefficient of the EURO variable is 
positive, it means that a single currency enhances banking integration. 
When the model is estimated for the sample of EU countries, the explanatory 
variables include also the dummy variable UK that takes the value of 1 if the observation 
corresponds to the United Kingdom and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the fact that 
United Kingdom has a highly differentiated market-oriented financial system, compared with 
the rest of the countries of the sample. 
The following results should be taken with caution since the number of observations 
is quite limited (around 40 country-year for Euro zone and 52 for EU). We have focused on the 
significant variables only in order to increase degrees of freedom. Despite that, adjusted R2 
are not very high, in particular for the outflows model. Certainly, the estimation results are a 
preliminary exploration of trends and explanatory variables. Nevertheless, taking into account 
the former important caveat, some preliminary conclusions arise which might be useful in 
shaping policy recommendations. 
Euro zone 
Table 9, first column, shows that size of the country is negatively correlated with the 
proportion of foreign banking assets in the country, and evidence that may be parallel to the 
observed fact that smaller countries are more open to foreign trade and investment. 
Secondly, countries more bank-oriented receive less foreign banking assets confirming that 
more efficient national banking systems attract less foreign competitors. Also, countries 
with more concentrated banking systems are less attractive for foreign banks, than countries 
otherwise (the variable Herfindahl is negatively associated with bank assets received). That 
might be an indirect evidence of the existence of effective barriers to entry into national 
banking markets. A banking system with banks not in the hands of few shareholders but, 
instead, widely held seems to be more contestable to foreign banks. Supervisory dependence 
of the government and lack of rule of law are strong entry barriers for foreign banks. 
Moreover, time dummies significantly register a growing trend in terms of penetration of 
banking systems by foreign banks in the Euro area. The hypothesis on determinant of inflows 
of banking assets are in general confirmed by the data and within the economic and 
institutional environment of the different countries the introduction of the Euro has a positive 
and significant effect in increasing the flows of banking assets over time. 
Table 10 refers to the determinants of outflows of banking assets. The variables 
INDEP and RULE are excluded as explanatory variables since they are not relevant to explain 
sending banking assets. As it was expected, the signs of the coefficients of the rest of 
economic and institutional variables are just the opposite as those of Table 9 which shows the 
determinants of receiving banking assets. Larger and more “bancarised” countries allow for 
larger banks in the domestic market and larger banks have more tangible and intangible 
assets to expand internationally. Apparently, more concentrated national markets facilitate the 
accumulation of slack resources, and more profits, that make easier the expansion abroad. 
The evidence would be consistent with the hypothesis that intense competition forces bank 
concentration, and surviving banks are in better conditions to expand to foreign markets, but 
this conclusion should be validated from larger and more representative data. The time 
dummies show coefficients with an increasing trend but they are not statistically significant. 
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European Union-15 
Table 9 and 10, second columns, shows the results of estimating the former two equations to 
the whole EU countries. It can be seen that all the variables keep their signs and level of 
statistical significance, with the exception of WIDE in the estimation of outflows for the Euro 
area countries only (Table 10).18 Therefore, the main conclusions above for the case of 
the EMU alone are basically confirmed, including the increasing time trend. In fact, when an 
interactive variable is defined in terms of TIME and EURO, the estimated coefficients 
corresponding to assets received are positive and significant, while the coefficient for 
the TIME dummies are not significant.19 This clearly indicates that Euro countries are in a 
positive trend of integration while in the other three, Sweden, Denmark and UK the trend is 
not detected. 
Both, the EURO dummy and the UK dummy variables show coefficients positive and 
statistically significant in Table 9. This means that countries in the Euro zone receive more 
bank assets on average than non Euro area countries. However, on average for the period, 
the coefficient for UK shows that this country is more open to foreign banks than the Euro 
zone, although the gap is closing as the positive trend in the TIME x EURO variable shows. 
In a similar vein, second column of Table 10 shows that bank outflows are positively 
affected by the Euro since the coefficient of the variable EURO is now positive but the 
coefficient of the variable UK is negative and statistically significant. On average, UK, Denmark 
and Sweden hold less banking assets in other EU countries than countries in the Euro zone, 
on average. The coefficients of the interactive variable TIME x EURO (not reported) also show 
an increasing trend for the Euro area. 
Unfortunately, lack of data from NMS prevent us from quantifying the determinants of 
openness of their banking systems. In any case, as mentioned in section 3, the fact that 
foreign ownership of banks is quite high in many of those countries is a new factor that should 
be considered. 
From our previous analysis it can be observed that there is a certain degree of 
asymmetries between the flows received and the flows sent across countries. In particular, 
the impact of the Euro appears to be higher in the banking assets received. Table 6 offers a 
possible explanation for this question. It seems to be the case that, since the introduction 
of the Euro, the level of flows sent by Euro zone countries has not experienced a 
significant increase. However, those countries may have reorganized the structure of their 
portfolios, increasing, as Table 6 shows, the relative importance of other Euro zone countries. 
                                                                          
18. We do not have an explanation for this change in sign for the estimated coefficient of WIDE. 
19. Not reported here. The reader interested can ask the corresponding author for those regression results. 
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5 Policy discussion 
Several issues arise from the former descriptive and econometric results. Banking integration 
across European countries, in terms of foreign banking assets, is low. Given the increasing 
evidence of high integration of interbank and, to a lesser extend, of wholesale 
banking markets, that result points towards the lack of integration of retail banking markets. 
If that is the result of remaining cross border country barriers (i.e. differences in taxation, 
regulation, idiosyncrasy) or, on the contrary, is the natural result of an activity that, mainly, 
could be considered non-tradable, in the sense that relationship banking for non-financial 
firms and high switching costs (enhanced by proximity services provided by dense branch 
networks) for households lead, naturally, to a low level of integration in terms of retail banking 
activities and, more generally, in terms of foreign banking assets, deserves further attention. 
However, the fact that the level of international activity across countries seems to respond to 
institutional as well as competitive and technical factors opens new ways to promote policies 
that would enhance integration such as regulatory independence at each country level, 
together with more open forms of bank ownership. 
More difficult recommendations can be made with regard to competitive conditions 
in national countries. On the one hand, there appears to be efficiency gains from absolute and 
relative size of the national banks that may explain why larger and more concentrated banking 
systems send more assets abroad, but at the same time the possibility that such structure of 
national champions be the result of strategic national barriers that contribute to perpetuate 
national concentration and higher profits is also a possibility. In any case, the point is that 
bank concentration can result from efficiency reasons in a competitive environment, and can 
not be considered per se evidence of lack of competition (i.e. more efficient banks take over 
less efficient ones with an increase in concentration as a result). 
The second result is that Euro seems to enhance banking integration. That might be 
the result of interbank assets but also the higher willingness of banks to explore new country 
markets trying to carve out a niche in specialized lending to households or non-financial 
firms. In terms of medium term strategies it could be also a way to take positions in foreign 
markets in order to be ready for future mergers and acquisitions. Some large Spanish, Dutch 
or German banks are buying small specialized lending firms or developing branch activities 
based on new technologies. This practice explains some of the asymmetries observed in the 
flows across countries, in the sense that all countries send assets abroad in amounts 
proportional to their respective sizes, but in terms of receiving assets small countries receive 
proportionally more than large ones. 
Regarding New Member States, in general, they have a larger degree of 
openness that some EU-15 banking markets. The expectations about joining the EU, 
already materialized, as well as expectations about joining the EMU, might have triggered 
across European banks an increasing interest in being present in their banking markets. 
At the sametime, historical and geographical reasons (i.e. proximity) or particular strategies 
of some large European banks are some of the driving forces behind the higher and 
increasing openness of these countries. 
Some academics sustain that banking trends in Europe pointed towards the need for 
a unified banking supervisor, in particular, in the Euro zone but, probably, outside the 
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European Central Bank.20 If we take into account the actual low level, albeit increasing along 
time, of foreign banking assets across European countries, a cooperative solution among 
supervisors seems more appropriate, at least for the time being. That cooperative approach is 
in fact the one that prevails now in Europe through the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) 
of the ECB and through the recently level 3 Committee of the European Banking Supervisors. 
Despite the limited data availability, the line of research that is opened with this paper 
seems promising, in particular regarding the integration of NMS banking systems and the 
integration of European banks in other areas such as non-European developed countries and 
also emerging countries outside Europe. 
                                                                          
20.  Danthine et al. (1999) and EEAG (2003). 
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6 Conclusion 
The paper studies the evolution and determinants of banking integration across European 
countries with particular attention to the impact that the Euro might have had on that process. 
Our work merges two particularly fruitful strands of economic literature: financial integration 
and the role of institutional factors for financial development. 
It is the first time that banking integration is being studied using quantitative 
indicators coming from banking consolidated data from the BIS. Previous work has focused 
mainly on price indicators, branches and subsidiaries or M&A activity. Not until very recently 
have started to appear measures of integration based on flows of quantities of loans and 
deposits. The scant papers that have used Euro area quantitative banking indicators are 
based on statistics designed mainly for monetary policy analysis or is obtained from non 
consolidated balance sheets, and, thus, has some inherent biases. 
The paper contains some country by country indicators of internationalisation of 
national banks as well as of openness of national banking systems. The analysis of the former 
indicators shows a growing trend towards both, internationalisation and openness of banking 
systems, in particular, in Euro area countries. Moreover, we provide evidence on the higher 
and increasing across time openness of countries that have been in the process of adjusting 
economic and financial institutions to become members of the European Union, a process 
that just ended a few months ago. 
The second new contribution of this paper is to investigate empirically the 
determinants of the degree of internationalisation and openness of country banking systems. 
We find that the size, the degree of “bancarisation” and the concentration of the banking 
system have opposite effects in terms of outflow and inflow of banking assets. The larger the 
country or the more bancarised or the higher the level of concentration in the national banking 
market, the lower the penetration of banking assets from abroad. At the same time these 
factors are positively associated with the amount of banking assets that are sent abroad that 
is with the level of internationalisation of the national banks. Moreover, the institutional 
framework has an impact on the openness of national banking systems. In particular the rules 
of law, the independence of the supervisor, and the absence of a dominant shareholder 
among banks have a positive impact for attracting foreign banks interest. 
Once we control for the determinants of foreign banking assets allocation, we focus 
our analysis on the role that the Euro and the single market promoted by the European Union 
might have had until now in order to spur banking integration in Europe. We find a significant 
and positive impact of the Euro although with some asymmetries in the evolution of flows 
send abroad and flows received. Thus, banking integration seems to proceed at a highest 
speed among Euro area countries than in EU or developed countries as a whole. Moreover, 
the impact of the Euro on financial integration is not of once for all but, on the contrary, more 
distributed along time. 
Although the trend towards more banking integration, in particular in Euro area 
countries, seems quite steady, it is true that the level of banking integration is still at a low 
level. Therefore, some concerns, mainly in the academic world, about the urgent need of a 
unique European banking supervisor are premature. The response given by European 
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supervisors through increased co-ordination around the European Central Bank (through its 
Banking Supervision Committee) or, more recently, around the CEBS (Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors) seem more in line with market developments in the European 
banking sector, at least for the time being. 
Finally, the results of the analysis indicate that the New Member States that joined 
the European Union in May 2004 show similar level of banking integration in terms of inflows 
of banking assets received than the existing member states, especially those of the Euro 
zone. Within the enlarged Union no unbalance exists in the level of banking integration 
between old and new members so no special developments should be expected for the near 
future. The reason of this balanced situation is that banking integration has been taking place 
steadily in the past with many banks, especially from neighboring countries, buying privatized 
banks of the countries waiting for joining the European Union. 
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Table 1. ‘Total Foreign Claims’ as percentage of Total Banking Assets of 
each country 
Sources: Total Foreign Claims from BIS  (http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm) and Total Banking 
Assets from ECB (2003b) 
 
Panel A: Total foreign claims received/sent from/to the Euro Area
1999 2000 2001 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 12.32 13.70 25.27 24.69 6.22 7.49 3.89 4.50
Belgium 14.60 15.46 15.98 22.98 26.08 30.87 32.86 36.74
Finland 14.57 18.09 14.15 13.16 5.84 6.69 3.52 3.34
France 5.71 6.68 6.27 7.02 8.39 7.55 7.26 9.22
Germany 4.07 3.60 3.58 5.35 7.80 9.08 10.66 10.53
Ireland 21.28 21.49 21.49 23.36 2.23 2.94 3.14
Italy 16.40 16.91 16.94 16.71 4.57 5.43 5.14 5.70
Netherlands  17.55 18.78 18.97 19.52 12.81 11.66 11.58 24.05
Portugal 13.31 20.30 20.29 24.45 4.94 3.88 3.92 5.46
Spain 9.75 10.72 10.43 12.95 7.46 8.93 8.46 8.99
Weighted average 8.55 9.16 9.58 11.13 8.55 9.16 9.58 11.45
Simple average 12.96 14.57 15.34 17.02 8.64 9.45 9.04 12.06
Panel B: Total foreign claims received/sent from/to the EU-15
1999 2000 2001 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 13.66 15.04 26.62 26.09 8.60 10.38 5.02 5.73
Belgium 16.89 17.93 18.08 25.86 34.56 40.82 42.56 50.84
Finland 24.02 31.35 23.80 22.34 15.33 21.83 22.39 20.44
France 6.73 9.21 8.63 9.32 11.24 10.47 10.25 12.37
Germany 4.85 5.29 5.27 6.56 12.89 15.93 19.66 19.37
Ireland 27.37 28.08 28.94 31.80 14.34 16.40 15.73
Italy 18.12 19.57 19.47 19.54 7.42 8.16 7.78 8.50
Netherlands 19.47 21.13 21.51 22.82 18.32 19.26 18.20 34.29
Portugal 14.53 21.97 22.52 27.45 6.88 5.91 6.20 7.25
Spain 11.31 12.42 12.12 15.24 9.23 11.39 10.75 11.45
Denmark 10.05 13.10 15.24 16.00 6.86 8.37 7.31 7.54
Sweden 14.22 16.26 15.88 14.05 11.68 23.21 19.86 13.69
UK 13.51 15.34 16.31 14.89 4.08 5.70 5.52 5.48
Weighted average 10.78 12.48 13.08 14.32 10.78 12.48 13.08 14.60
Simple average 14.98 17.44 18.03 19.38 12.42 15.22 14.71 16.41
Received (I1) Sent (I2)
Received (I1) Sent (I2)
                 Table 2. ‘Total Foreign Claims’ as percentage of GDP of each country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Sources: Total Foreign Claims from BIS (http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm) and GDP from OECD (Main Economic Indicators, January 2004) 
Total foreign claims received/sent from/to the Developed Countries declaring to the BIS
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria 38.29 45.95 79.79 74.94 72.74 48.34 60.05 29.42 33.25 38.65
Belgium 69.73 62.74 71.32 92.85 94.55 153.30 175.61 199.76 223.83 217.97
Canada 18.53 20.09 20.69 20.46 18.83 44.85 42.88 48.44 45.09 42.94
Finland 28.31 37.45 34.95 31.95 24.42 24.47 29.72 42.87 41.18 35.70
France 24.02 29.97 29.54 32.44 33.67 58.14 60.37 62.01 72.83 77.59
Germany 21.79 25.70 27.82 31.61 32.55 81.95 100.02 118.58 109.87 100.58
Ireland 110.05 122.27 133.84 142.26 181.01 78.82 91.15 92.88
Italy 31.73 35.75 35.94 38.89 39.28 21.90 26.52 25.14 26.00 22.39
Japan 8.55 7.62 8.59 8.98 10.92 22.97 24.46 28.14 28.64 28.77
Netherlands 66.45 79.44 81.25 87.43 96.76 101.46 109.28 108.14 220.42 232.13
Norway 26.89 29.75 35.96 42.79 37.19 2.20 7.96 6.68 6.86 7.75
Portugal 43.77 64.92 68.58 79.99 113.11 39.24 39.88 36.32 36.46 46.27
Spain 24.70 28.11 28.08 35.39 38.64 42.37 63.44 59.22 52.33 48.82
Denmark 30.31 42.16 49.90 54.60 42.30 28.89 31.60 28.96 31.68 38.81
Sweden 30.72 35.84 40.86 38.47 36.23 36.04 60.90 63.95 57.17 135.67
Switzerland 39.91 52.06 55.03 51.40 43.57 372.60 401.86 432.39 478.91 495.73
UK 76.75 86.26 90.17 90.20 94.17 59.24 73.98 80.59 86.56 91.07
US 20.27 22.46 24.39 27.46 30.14 7.36 7.61 7.98 7.15 7.72
Weighted average 25.08 27.50 30.06 33.54 36.25 34.94 37.76 41.01 44.19 47.70
Simple average 39.49 46.03 50.93 54.56 57.78 68.01 78.18 81.75 91.66 98.15
Received (I21) Sent (I22)
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Table 3. ‘Total Foreign Claims’ received by New Member States as 
percentage of GDP of each country 
Panel A: Total foreign claims received from Euro Zone
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cyprus 52.10 56.72 51.91 41.24 43.58
Czech Republic 30.15 42.89 51.09 51.27 65.08
Estonia 12.75 11.82 14.96 20.61 18.58
Hungary 36.52 43.07 43.55 46.39 51.98
Latvia 6.15 7.47 12.48 16.76 15.94
Lithuania 6.11 6.34 6.76 10.93 12.70
Malta 65.64 75.22 78.84 69.41 107.75
Poland 11.41 22.32 29.39 30.72 31.45
Slovakia 22.03 19.83 21.19 50.38 48.74
Slovenia 9.94 14.74 21.51 26.30 32.03
NMS, Weighted average 19.98 28.33 33.69 37.14 41.90
NMS, Simple average 25.28 30.04 33.17 36.40 42.78
EMU, Weighted average 20.23 22.18 23.74 27.93 29.47
EMU, Simple average 30.99 35.25 39.82 44.61 47.67
Total, Weighted average 20.22 22.52 24.33 28.49 30.20
Total, Simple average 28.13 32.64 36.49 40.51 45.23
Note: Ireland is excluded because it does not report to the BIS with this level of detail.
Panel B: Total foreign claims received from EU-15
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cyprus 59.87 64.64 60.04 49.54 52.29
Czech Republic 30.88 44.01 52.14 52.28 66.48
Estonia 36.53 65.46 67.97 76.74 18.94
Hungary 37.76 44.50 45.08 47.60 53.00
Latvia 12.98 18.16 28.47 28.10 15.97
Lithuania 7.52 18.88 21.92 20.44 12.77
Malta 148.93 157.01 159.67 156.33 204.20
Poland 11.95 22.85 30.01 31.47 32.01
Slovakia 22.66 20.49 21.65 50.87 49.74
Slovenia 10.27 15.10 21.57 26.34 32.21
NMS, Weighted average 22.28 31.63 37.09 40.41 43.80
NMS, Simple average 37.94 47.11 50.85 53.97 53.76
EU-15, Weighted average 26.00 30.82 33.91 37.89 40.65
EU-15, Simple average 34.38 39.31 45.51 49.71 56.01
Total, Weighted average 25.86 30.85 34.06 38.01 40.79
Total, Simple average 35.93 42.70 47.83 51.56 55.03
Note: Ireland and Denmark are excluded because they do not report to the BIS with this level of 
        detail.
Panel C: Total foreign claims received from Developed Countries declaring to the BIS
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cyprus 64.39 69.10 64.38 55.17 58.14
Czech Republic 34.15 46.66 54.73 55.46 69.45
Estonia 37.40 66.22 71.60 77.41 19.59
Hungary 42.22 49.80 49.56 51.95 56.02
Latvia 13.87 18.60 28.81 28.30 16.16
Lithuania 9.94 20.91 23.23 21.72 13.15
Malta 152.50 163.09 167.02 164.19 213.27
Poland 14.13 27.20 33.81 35.66 36.01
Slovakia 28.34 25.45 27.03 55.26 52.99
Slovenia 10.76 15.89 22.07 26.84 32.69
NMS, Weighted average 25.10 35.47 40.60 44.10 47.03
NMS, Simple average 40.77 50.29 54.23 57.20 56.75
Developed, Weighted average 23.60 25.88 28.33 32.06 34.82
Developed, Simple average 37.95 44.08 48.77 52.95 55.94
Total, Weighted average 23.62 26.02 28.52 32.27 35.04
Total, Simple average 38.96 46.30 50.72 54.47 56.23
Note: Ireland, Denmark, Canada and Norway are excluded because they do not report to the BIS 
        with this level of detail.
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Table 4. ‘Total Foreign Claims’ sent to New Member States as % of GDP of 
each country 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria 3.57 5.73 4.60 5.78 7.86
Belgium 4.30 7.92 11.36 12.83 12.84
Finland 0.38 0.54 1.16 1.78 1.21
France 0.41 0.38 0.84 0.86 1.44
Germany 1.50 1.93 2.73 3.02 3.14
Italy 0.27 1.50 1.74 2.09 2.09
Netherlands 2.47 2.88 2.56 3.14 3.14
Portugal 0.11 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.22
Spain 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11
EMU, Weighted average 1.09 1.68 2.16 2.46 2.67
EMU, Simple average 1.45 2.35 2.82 3.31 3.56
Sweden 0.89 2.32 3.17 3.05 0.31
United Kingdom 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.48
EU-15, Weighted average 0.96 1.46 1.86 2.08 2.20
EU-15, Simple average 1.31 2.17 2.63 3.03 2.98
Switzerland 0.63 0.72 0.83 0.92 0.77
United States 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Japan 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Total, Weighted average 0.39 0.55 0.70 0.81 0.93
Total, Simple average 1.08 1.77 2.14 2.45 2.41
Note: Ireland, Denmark, Canada and Norway are excluded because they do not report to the 
         BIS with this level of detail.
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Table 5. ‘Total Foreign Claims’ sent to New Member States as percentage 
of total foreign claims sent to emerging markets 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria 34.56 40.99 51.86 53.86 58.59
Belgium 51.18 58.83 71.95 72.27 73.73
Finland 18.55 23.17 39.56 62.59 66.42
France 5.36 5.16 11.41 11.53 18.27
Germany 16.59 19.57 25.45 30.43 31.88
Italy 8.16 27.09 31.42 38.96 45.49
Netherlands 12.02 14.12 13.42 16.58 16.06
Portugal 4.52 9.45 10.91 8.44 10.02
Spain 0.46 0.25 0.32 0.41 0.58
EMU, Weighted average 12.23 14.80 19.12 23.33 26.22
EMU, Simple average 16.82 22.07 28.48 32.79 35.67
Sweden 45.04 64.39 68.24 72.47 0.58
United Kingdom 5.10 4.42 4.60 4.36 5.04
EU-15, Weighted average 11.29 13.63 17.43 20.51 19.32
EU-15, Simple average 18.32 24.31 29.92 33.81 29.70
Switzerland 4.21 4.90 5.47 5.96 4.17
United States 3.12 4.68 3.82 5.38 5.26
Japan 1.90 2.13 1.80 2.13 2.64
Total, Weighted average 8.68 11.01 13.26 16.43 16.26
Total, Simple average 15.05 19.94 24.30 27.53 24.19
Note: Ireland, Denmark, Canada and Norway are excluded because they do not report to the 
         BIS with this level of detail.
                    Table 6. Portfolio structure over time 
 
Panel A: Sent by EMU
Other
Total  Japon US Other Developed Total Africa Asia Latam
Total    EMU Other Total    NMS UE Other
1999 75.55 50.21 33.34 16.87 2.45 13.98 8.92 15.68 1.87 2.91 3.49 2.05 1.45 7.41 8.77
2000 73.29 49.43 30.76 18.66 2.14 13.73 7.99 17.58 1.81 2.47 4.56 3.05 1.51 8.74 9.13
2001 74.62 49.73 30.48 19.26 2.07 13.09 9.72 18.27 1.93 2.05 5.74 4.22 1.52 8.55 7.11
2002 77.78 51.63 33.04 18.59 1.90 14.59 9.66 16.41 1.74 1.59 6.39 4.63 1.76 6.69 5.82
2003 79.15 54.59 35.26 19.34 2.25 13.56 8.75 15.63 1.44 1.54 6.99 5.09 1.88 5.67 5.22
Note: Ireland is excluded because it does not report to the BIS enough detail in emergin markets
Panel B: Sent by EU-15
Other
Total  Japon US Other Developed Total Africa Asia Latam
Total    EMU Other Total    NMS UE Other
1999 75.91 47.94 31.26 16.67 2.68 15.61 9.68 14.53 1.82 2.99 3.23 1.96 1.26 6.49 9.56
2000 74.26 48.56 30.97 17.59 2.17 15.12 8.41 16.05 1.75 2.55 4.20 2.89 1.31 7.55 9.68
2001 75.13 48.51 30.56 17.95 2.10 14.61 9.91 16.62 1.84 2.18 5.26 3.95 1.31 7.35 8.25
2002 77.91 49.15 31.31 17.83 1.95 16.58 10.23 15.10 1.68 1.78 5.81 4.31 1.50 5.82 6.99
2003 76.65 51.51 34.85 16.66 2.12 14.70 8.31 17.37 1.42 1.73 5.83 4.23 1.58 8.39 5.98
Note: Ireland and Denmark excluded because it does not report to the BIS enough detail in emergin markets
Panel C: Sent by Developed Countries declaring to the BIS
Other
Total  Japon US Other Developed Total Africa Asia Latam
Total    EMU Other Total    NMS UE Other
1999 75.62 45.61 28.52 17.09 3.36 19.25 9.01 14.53 1.72 3.62 2.77 1.63 1.14 6.42 9.85
2000 74.85 45.78 28.06 17.72 2.98 19.52 8.18 15.41 1.63 3.08 3.57 2.39 1.18 7.13 9.74
2001 75.28 45.25 27.94 17.31 2.83 19.58 9.21 16.09 1.68 2.73 4.35 3.21 1.14 7.33 8.63
2002 77.78 46.24 29.06 17.17 2.58 21.01 9.63 14.60 1.54 2.41 4.83 3.52 1.31 5.82 7.62
2003 76.82 48.22 31.81 16.41 2.78 19.18 8.20 16.25 1.32 2.42 4.84 3.45 1.38 7.66 6.94
Note: Ireland, Denmark, Canada and Norway excluded because it does not report to the BIS enough detail in emergin markets
Developed Developing
EU Europe
Developed Developing
EU Europe
Developed Developing
EU Europe
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Table 7. Ordinary Least Square regression of ‘Total Foreign Claims’ as % of 
GDP as a function of country, time and euro/new member state variables 
 
Sent
Coeffcient (2) Coeffcient (3) Coeffcient (4)
Austria -- -- -21.24 *** --
Belgium 15.90 *** 15.57 ** -5.67 152.17 ***
Canada -67.80 *** -62.86 *** -62.86 *** -33.46 **
Finland -30.92 *** -39.76 *** -39.76 *** -7.15
France -32.40 *** -31.50 *** -52.74 *** 24.26 *
Germany -34.45 *** -31.78 *** -53.03 *** 60.27 ***
Ireland 67.33 *** -34.20 *** -55.45 *** 53.64 ***
Italy -26.01 *** 70.54 *** 49.30 *** -17.54
Japan -78.59 *** -25.39 *** -46.63 *** -51.69 ***
Netherlands 19.94 *** -73.75 *** -73.75 112.35 ***
Norway -53.00 *** 19.66 *** -1.58 *** -72.00 ***
Portugal 11.74 *** -51.09 * -51.09 -2.29
Spain -31.36 *** 12.02 *** -9.22 *** 11.30
Denmark -43.66 *** -30.62 *** -51.86 *** -46.31 ***
Sweden -51.10 *** -51.83 *** -51.83 *** -7.54
Switzerland -39.11 *** -35.09 *** -35.09 *** 358.00 ***
United States -61.36 *** -59.58 *** -59.58 *** -70.73 ***
Cyprus -- -20.26 *** -- --
Czech Republic -- -30.41 *** -10.15 --
Estonia -- -28.06 *** -7.79 --
Hungary -- -32.59 *** -12.33 * --
Latvia -- -61.35 *** -41.09 *** --
Lithuania -- -64.71 *** -44.45 *** --
Malta -- 89.51 *** 109.78 *** --
Poland -- -53.14 *** -32.87 *** --
Slovakia -- -44.69 *** -24.42 *** --
Slovenia -- -60.85 *** -40.59 *** --
2000 5.54 7.49 ** 6.13 * 9.64
2001 9.21 ** 11.17 *** 10.82 *** 15.37
2002 10.30 *** 13.53 *** 15.00 *** 20.99 *
2003 8.43 ** 12.02 *** 17.99 *** 34.29 ***
2000*euro 1.81 -0.41 -- 0.97
2001*euro 4.02 1.67 -- -2.94
2002*euro 8.59 5.55 -- 6.35
2003*euro 14.23 *** 14.71 ** -- -6.51
2000*nms -- -- 3.39 --
2001*nms -- -- 2.63 --
2002*nms -- -- 1.43 --
2003*nms -- -- -2.01 --
euro -30.91 *** -25.55 *** -35.94 **
nms -- -- -21.35 *** --
constant 80.82 *** 73.66 *** 72.51 *** 62.24 ***
No. Obs. 89 140 140 88
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.95
Note: ***/**/* denote  significance at 1% / 5% / 10% level
        The coefficients of the individual country dummy variables show differences in banking 
         internazionalization, in columns 1,3 and 4  with respect to the UK and Austria, in 
         column 2 with respect to the UK and Cyprus.
Received
Coeffcient (1)
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Table 8. Summary Statistics 
 
SIZE: GDP of country c in year t over the sum of GDP in year t for the countries in our 
sample. GDP is obtained from OCDE. 
BANCAR: Total banking assets of country c in year t divided by each country GDP. 
ECB (2003b). 
HERF: Herfindhal index of concentration of the bank assets of country c in period t. 
ECB (2003b). 
WIDE: Degree of dispersion of ownership of the banks of each country. The variable is 
calculated for a sample of the ten largest traded banks in terms of total assets at the end of 
December 2001. Caprio et al. (2003). 
INDEP: Degree of independence of the banking supervisor from the Government. The 
variable is based on a survey conducted between 1998 and 2000. Caprio et al. (2003). 
RULE: Assessment of law and order tradition in the country. It is an average from 1982 
to 1995. La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Panel A: Euro Area
Nº Obs Mean Std. Desv. Min Max
size 40 10.00 9.96 1.46 32.27
bancar 40 2.47 0.73 0.98 3.70
herf 40 9.23 6.45 1.00 22.00
wide 36 0.28 0.31 0.00 1.00
indep 36 2.89 1.21 1.00 4.00
rule 40 9.03 0.83 7.80 10.00
Panel B: European Union
Nº Obs Mean Std. Desv. Min Max
size 52 7.69 7.60 1.13 25.04
bancar 52 2.51 0.73 0.98 4.00
herf 52 9.75 6.67 1.00 22.00
wide 48 0.30 0.32 0.00 1.00
indep 48 2.83 1.23 1.00 4.00
rule 52 9.15 0.82 7.80 10.00
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Table 9.  OLS estimates of the determinants of ‘Total Foreign Claims’ 
Received as % of Total Banking Assets 
 
The P-value provides, directly, the level of significance of the parameter. 
 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
SIZE -0.99 0.000 -1.26 0.000
BANCAR -9.16 0.020 -8.93 0.000
HERF -1.11 0.004 -0.65 0.015
WIDE 10.64 0.034 19.60 0.000
INDEP 5.27 0.014 3.73 0.003
RULE 5.58 0.011 7.61 0.000
EURO -- -- 9.30 0.000
UK -- -- 13.20 0.000
2000 3.14 0.091 3.24 0.025
2001 5.58 0.011 5.56 0.001
2002 6.68 0.003 6.85 0.000
CONS -34.18 0.101 -42.27 0.008
Nº Obs
Adj R-squared 0.68 0.78
Euro area European Union 
36 48
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Table 10.  OLS estimates of the determinants of ‘Total Foreign Claims’ Sent 
as % of Total Banking Assets 
 
The P-value provides, directly, the level of significance of the parameter. 
 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
SIZE 0.25 0.000 0.46 0.000
BANCAR 2.92 0.001 2.33 0.035
HERF 0.37 0.004 1.12 0.000
WIDE -5.20 0.030 5.54 0.075
EURO -- -- 4.93 0.007
UK -- -- -7.16 0.031
2000 -0.09 0.949 2.26 0.174
2001 -1.30 0.369 0.57 0.732
2002 0.83 0.576 1.37 0.425
CONS -4.09 0.148 -13.21 0.002
Nº Obs
Adj R-squared 0.45 0.60
Euro area European Union 
35 47
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Chart 1. Evolution of ‘Total Foreign Claims’ (Received and Sent), as % of 
Total Banking Assets and GDP. Simple Average of countries belonging to 
the Euro area 
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Chart 2. ‘Total Foreign Claims’ send to New Member States from different 
regions 
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